Editor’s Note: James Rae, professor at California State University Sacramento, was a Fulbright Fellow at Beijing Foreign Studies University from 2017 to 2018. The article reflects the views of the author and not necessarily those of CGTN.

On October 4, 2021, at the American research organization Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Ambassador Katherine Chi Tai, the United States Trade Representative, made brief remarks and answered questions about the state of trade relations between the United States and China.

Much of his presentation focused on the recent history of trade tensions between the United States and China and often focused on the American audience and President Joe Biden’s national priorities to “build back better”, that is. ie a draft infrastructure plan. Among Ambassador Tai’s political statements, she included the use of the phase one agreement of the administration of former President Donald Trump as a starting point between the two countries, offered a possibility of exclusion under the current tariff regime and continued to review the Chinese state-led policy model. economics and non-market business practices.

Overall, the tone was generally positive, and his approach suggests an opportunity to improve discussions on bilateral trade relations. His presentation will be interpreted in multiple ways, but his measured tone and pragmatic outlook is certainly a welcome respite from the highly ideological disposition of some of Trump’s advisers to China. Several areas of his comments merit further discussion despite his answers reserved for questions.

Tai reinforced the Biden administration’s priority of rebuilding multilateral partnerships, often referring to the mutual interests of the United States to be defended as well as increased collaboration between other democracies and market economies. She also identified China’s great success in becoming a manufacturing powerhouse, specifying dramatic increases in steel and solar cell production. Here, the United States frames a zero-sum competition that aims for ever more aggressive policies to bring China in line.

In this regard, additional tariffs were mentioned as a possible recourse and a suggestion that the Trump administration’s approach was just too one-sided but fundamentally on track to meet the challenge. Again, a remedy would be to reinvigorate America’s infrastructure with legislative priorities to reinvest in domestic manufacturing and hardware (ironically the kind of state-led model that is so despised in Washington when practiced by Beijing. ). She also suggested that restarting the dialogue from the existing architecture of the previous administration was a logical start. Certainly, this adds some cover to the allegations of weakness towards China that are sure to occur if trade relations improve.

Interpreted positively, one can imagine that the Biden team would start from the elements of the Phase One commitments, turn them into a national political victory by meeting the planned target of $ 200 billion in purchases of US goods by China over the course of the last two years. Although the data exists, the precise calculations of the current state are unclear; some outside observers suggest current purchases are already about two-thirds of that target three months from the end. Tai seemed less eager to follow Trump’s path toward the more general Phase Two arrangement. Indeed, she replied that “decoupling” is unrealistic and instead presented the possibility of “recoupling” as a separate possibility.

Of course, one can hardly expect China to meet American demands. The Trump administration largely ignored the dialogue process after securing the first phase commitments, dramatically escalating hostilities with corporate write-offs and opposing China in non-trade spheres as well. Why should China honor a pledge when the United States falls short of its end of the bargain?

Plus, how can China be expected to meet import criteria during a global supply chain collapse amid a one-of-a-kind pandemic where consumer spending is drastically weakened?

Finally, the background of the positions of the two American administrations aims to problematize the very economic model of China – socialism with Chinese characteristics. He is obviously a non-starter and it is better to leave him out of the negotiation process since he is indeed non-negotiable. More Section 301 investigations, more tariffs, more write-offs and more rhetorical hostilities won’t help the global economy or bilateral trade.

So, going back to the beginning, Tai’s remarks were measured and flexible, leaving ample opportunity to engage in diplomatic forums and various avenues to follow. Her crafting of the Phase One arrangement as a natural starting point for entering into ongoing deliberations makes sense, even if she only embarks from a leverage position.

We must look forward to the next steps in the talks between the two sides and carefully monitor the steps towards engagement. The US political calculation will begin to creep in next year with the midterm elections looming, and trade will likely remain a contentious issue in domestic efforts to gain an advantage in public opinion.

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